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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Claimants Jeffrey Reid and Sandra Snyder-Reid ("Claimants") appeal the stipulated
Judgment of Forfeiture, entered by the district court on February 21, 2013, granting Respondent
Barry McHugh ("McHugh") all right, title and interest in, and immediate possession of, One
Blue 2007 Toyota FJ Cruiser, VIN NO. JTEBUIIF470014172.

B.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 2,2012, Kootenai County Sheriff Deputy Dennis Stinebaugh effected a
traffic stop of the defendant vehicle, having been informed by a reporting party that the driver,
Claimant Jeffrey Reid, was dumping marijuana plants by the side of the road and having
observed the vehicle travel at a speed of 57 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone. R. Vol. I,
p. 112. Deputy Stinebaugh informed Claimant Jeffrey Reid why he had stopped the vehicle,
asked whether any marijuana or paraphernalia was in the vehicle, and received consent to search
the vehicle. R. Vol. I, p. 113. As Claimant Jeffrey Reid opened the rear hatch of the vehicle
and gestured for the Deputy to look inside, Deputy Stinebaugh observed green plant material he
identified as marijuana fall from the vehicle to the ground; Deputy Stinebaugh also smelled the
strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle and located several cardboard boxes in the
rear of the vehicle containing marijuana plant material. Id. Claimant Jeffrey Reid was arrested
and booked for drug trafficking. R. Vol. I, p. 114. The vehicle was impounded and towed to
Sunset Towing; it was then towed to the Kootenai County Sheriffs Office evidence yard. Id.

Simultaneous with Claimant Jeffrey Reid's arrest, Kootenai County Sheriffs Office
Detective Mark Ellis traveled to Claimants' home and made contact with Claimant Sandra
Snyder-Reid. R. Vol. I, p. 106. Claimant Sandra Snyder-Reid consented to a search of the
residence. R. Vol. I, p. 107. A search of the residence and shed uncovered equipment for a
marijuana grow operation, marijuana, paraphernalia, and U.S. currency. R. Vol. I, pp. 108-09.
Claimant Sandra Snyder-Reid was arrested and booked for manufacturing and trafficking
marijuana. R. Vol. I, p. 109. All evidence was seized and booked into the Kootenai County
Public Safety Building. Id.
McHugh filed his Complaint in RE: Civil Forfeiture on January 19, 2012. R. Vo. I, p. 6. I
Claimant Jeffrey Reid filed his unverified Answer on February 8, 2012. R. Vol. I, p. 11.
Claimant Sandra Snyder-Reid filed her unverified Answer on February 27,2012. R. Vol. I, p.
14. Claimants filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 19,2012. R. Vol. I, p. 22. The district court
heard oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss on May 24, 2012, and issued its written
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Joint Motion to Dismiss Action Under Idaho Code
§ 37-2744 on June 12,2012. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 5-16; R. Vol. I, p. 29. Claimants thereafter filed a

motion for reconsideration of the Court's denial, but failed to notice the motion for hearing. R.
Vol. I, p. 36.

1 Claimants mistakenly refer to "the State" throughout their Defendant-Appellant's Opening
Brief. This civil asset forfeiture action was not brought by the State of Idaho; rather, the action
was instituted by McHugh, the "appropriate prosecuting attorney," in his name. See I.C. § 3727 44( c)(3).
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On December 18,2013, the district court heard McHugh's motion for summary
judgment. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 19-26. The court granted partial summary judgment as to the 2007
Toyota FJ Cruiser in favor of McHugh. Tr. Vol. I, p. 41; R. Vol. I, p. 228. Before the Court at
summary judgment was uncontested evidence of Claimant Jeffrey Reid's April 2, 2012, plea of
guilty to the felony charge of Delivery of a Controlled Substance--Marijuana in the underlying
Kootenai County criminal case CRF 2012-159 and Claimant Sandra Snyder-Reid's March 26,
2012, guilty plea to Manufacturing a Controlled Substance--Marijuana in the underlying
Kootenai County criminal case CRF 2012-148. R. Vol. I, pp. 127 and 138. The court also
heard Claimants' motion for reconsideration of denial of their Motion to Dismiss, noticed for
hearing by McHugh, on December 18, 2013. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 19-26. The court denied
Claimant's motion and granted McHugh attorney's fees and costs incurred as a result of
Claimants' having filed for reconsideration. Tr. Vol. I, p. 26, Ll. 10-12.
On February 20,2013, the parties filed their Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, in
which they stipulated and agreed "that the above-referenced action may be dismissed with
prejudice, with each party to bear their own respective attorney fees and costs." R. Vol. I, pp.
247-48. The parties also submitted an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice and a Judgment of
Forfeiture, both signed and entered by the Court on February 21,2013. R. Vol. I, pp. 252-256.
The Judgment of Forfeiture recognizes the stipulation the parties entered into and orders
McHugh receive $1,000.00 and all right, title, and interest in the defendant vehicle; the
Judgment orders that Claimants receive $700.00. R. Vol. I, p. 256. The Judgment goes on to
state that, "the Stipulation entered into by the parties hereby settles with prejudice all existing
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material claims which relate to the seizure and forfeiture of the seized personal property and
currency ... " Id. Claimants filed their Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 258

II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

CLAIMANTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING THE INSTANT
APPEAL BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED BY CONSENT
OF THE PARTIES AND CLAIMANTS FAILED TO EXPLICITLY AND
UNEQUIVOCALL Y RESERVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL.

B.

RESPONDENT BARRY MCHUGH IS ENTITLED TO HIS
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS UNDER IDAHO CODE §
12-117 BECAUSE CLAIMANTS ACTED WITHOUT A REASONABLE
BASIS IN FACT OR LAW.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
District court findings of fact supported by substantial evidence are not disturbed on
appeal. Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney v. Reese, 142 Idaho 893, 897, 136 P.3d 364,368
(Ct.App. 2006), citing State v. Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 52, 981 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Ct.App. 1999).
Alleged violations of constitutional rights present mixed questions of law and fact. Id.
"On appeal, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial
evidence, but we freely review the trial court's determinations as to whether constitutional
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found." Id.
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IV. ARGUMENT
A. CLAIMANTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING THE INSTANT
APPEAL BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED BY CONSENT
OF THE PARTIES AND CLAIMANTS FAILED TO EXPLICITLY AND
UNEQUIVOCALLY RESERVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL.
As a threshold matter, Claimants are precluded from appealing the district court's entry
of a stipulated judgment. It is well settled that "a consent judgment is not subject to appellate
review." Pacific Nat. Bank of Washington v. Mount, 97 Idaho 887, 887-88, 556 P.2d 70, 70-71
(1976) (citations omitted). In Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. United States, the
United States Supreme Court wrote:
But the insurmountable difficulty is that the former decree appears upon its face
to have been rendered by consent of the parties, and could not therefore be
reversed, even on appeal. Courts of chancery generally hold that from a decree by
consent no appeal lies. Although that rule has not prevailed in this court under the
terms of the acts of congress regulating its appellate jurisdiction, yet a decree,
which appears by the record to have been rendered by consent, is always
affirmed, without considering the merits of the cause. A fortiori, neither party can
deny its effect as a bar of a subsequent suit on any claim included in the decree.
113 U.S. 261, 266, 5 S.Ct. 460, 462 (1885) (citations omitted). See also, Plasterers Local Union
No. 346 v. Wyland, 819 F .2d 217, 219 (9th Cir. 1987) (generally, a party may not gain review of

a stipulated judgment); Slaven v. Am., Trading Transp. Co., 146 F.3d 1066,1070 (9 th Cir. 1998)?

2 Circuit Courts of Appeal have examined the issue in terms of whether an ongoing adversarial
relationship exists between the parties on appeal. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that a settlement resolving a dispute and releasing the opposing litigants renders an appeal moot.
Matter ofS. L. E., Inc., 674 F.2d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 1982); and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has treated a voluntary dismissal with prejudice as depriving the Court of jurisdiction to consider
an appeal because it is not an involuntary adverse judgment. Seidman v. City of Beverly Hills,
785 F.2d 1447, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Bowers v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 668 F.2d
369,369 (8th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 946,102 S.Ct. 2013 (1982».
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Exceptions to the general rule that a party cannot appeal a judgment entered with that party's
consent exist, but have no application in the instant matter. See, e.g., Pacific Nat. Bank of

Washington, 97 Idaho at 888, 556 P.2d at 71 (exceptions include lack of actual consent to
judgment; lack of jurisdiction over subject matter; judgment obtained by fraud, collusion or
mistake; and judgment adversely affecting the public interest); Tapper v. Commissioner, 766
F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1985) (recognizing exceptions where a party did not actually consent or
the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction); Clapp v. Commm'r, 875 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir.
1989) (subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment was lacking). The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Slaven, quoted Association of Community Orgs. For Reform Now v. Edgar, 99 F.3d
261, 262 (7th Cir. 1996), in which Judge Posner discussed the requirement that reservations of
the right to appeal be explicit:
A party to a consent decree or other judgment entered by consent may not appeal
unless it explicitly reserves the right to appeal. The purpose of a consent
judgment is to resolve a dispute without further litigation, and so would be
defeated or at least impaired by an appeal. The presumption, therefore, is that the
consent operates as a waiver of the right to appeal. It is because the parties should
not be left guessing about the finality and hence efficacy of the settlement that any
reservation of a right to appeal should be explicit.

Slaven, 146 F.3d 1066, 1070 (emphasis in original); see also, Coughlin v. Regan, 768 F.2d 468,
470 (1 st Cir. 1986) ("While it is possible for a party to consent to a judgment and still preserve
his right to appeal, he must reserve that right unequivocally, as it will not be presumed.").
This Court, in Pacific Nat. Bank of Washington, held, "[w]here none of the foregoing
exceptions are urged or argued, a decree which shows by the record to have been rendered by
consent is always affirmed, without considering the merits of the cause." 97 Idaho 887, 888, 556
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P.2d 70, 71 (citations omitted). Here, the parties entered into a StipUlation for Dismissal and
filed the same on February 20, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 247. On February 20,2013, the parties also
submitted an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice and a Judgment of Forfeiture, both entered by
the court on February 21,2013. R. Vol. I, pp. 252-57. The Judgment of Forfeiture states
outright that the parties entered into a Stipulation for Judgment of Forfeiture. R. Vol. I, p. 255.
And, the Judgment of Forfeiture orders, adjudges, and decrees that McHugh receive $1,000 in
u.S. currency and all right, title, and interest in the defendant vehicle. Id.

At no time did

Claimants move the district court or this Court for any relief from the final Judgment. Nor have
Claimants explicitly and unequivocally reserved the right to appeal. As such, Claimants are
precluded from appealing the judgment entered by their consent.

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND NO MATERIAL
ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED WITH REGARD TO THE
PROPORTIONALITY OF THE VALUE OF DEFENDANT
VEHICLE
TO
THE
CLAIMANTS'
OFFENSES,
AND
CLAIMANTS ARE BARRED FROM ATTEMPTING TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE OF THE VEHICLE'S VALUE FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL.

Idaho Appellate Courts will not consider for the first time issues which were not properly
raised before the district court. Eldridge v. Payette-Boise Water Users' Ass 'n, 50 Idaho 347, 296
P. 1022 (1931) ("This Court will not consider an exhibit or evidence, not part of the record
before the trial court.") Specifically, "[a]ppellate review is limited to the evidence theories and
arguments that were presented below." Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375, 379
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(2007), quoting Obenchain v. }vfcAlvain Canst., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57, 137 P.3d 443,444
(2006). In Nelson, this Court discussed an appellant's attempt to add to the record before the
Court by attaching matters to his opening appellate brief; the Court noted the documents do not
appear in the record, and, in fact, two of the documents are dated after entry of the orders being
appealed. Nelson, 144 Idaho at 714, 170 P.2d at 379. The Court determined the appellant's
attempt to introduce evidence in this manner was improper and the evidence was disregarded.

Id.
Here, Claimants attempt to present the Court with evidence of the purported value of the
defendant vehicle in support of their claim that forfeiture of the vehicle amounts to an Eighth
Amendment excessive fine. Defendant-Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 3. Claimants set forth the
Kelley Blue Book Value, based on an internet search completed on July 7,2013. Id. The record
on appeal is devoid of any evidence regarding the value of the defendant vehicle? In his Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, McHugh states that, with regard to
Claimants' contention that forfeiture of the defendant vehicle amounts to an excessive fine and is
violative of Eighth Amendment protections, " ... Reids provide the Court with no evidence as to
the defendant vehicle's value." R. Vol. I, p. 211. Claimants cannot now present evidence

In her Affidavit in Support of Motion to Release Vehicle Due to Hardship, Claimant Sandra
Snyder-Reid testifies to making payments of $118.00 every two weeks on the vehicle. R. Vol. I,
p. 162. And, in Exhibit 3 to the Claimants' Motion to Return Previously Seized Vehicle Pending
Disposition of the State's Complaint Seeking Forfeiture, Claimants provide an unauthenticated,
uncertified, and unacknowledged "Account History Inquiry," listing the payments they made and
the balance remaining on the account. R. Vol. I, pp. 173-176. Neither reference to bi-monthly
payments nor to a balance remaining serve to establish the value of the defendant vehicle, these
references merely go to what Claimants pay for and owe on the vehicle.
3
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beyond that which was before the district court. And, Claimants cannot present a vehicle value
based on an internet search performed well after the date of entry of the judgment they now
appeal. See, Nelson, supra.
As McHugh argued before the district court, the Idaho Court of Appeals in Reese set
forth the factors to consider in determining whether a forfeiture "bears some relationship to the
gravity of the offense it is designed to punish." R. Vol. I, p. 211, quoting Reese, 142 Idaho at
899, 136 P.3d at 370. The factors include: the nature and extent of the crime; whether the
violation was related to other criminal activity; other penalties that may be imposed; the extent of
harm caused; what other penalties are authorized by the legislature; the culpability of the
claimant; the role played by the claimant and the defendant property in the offense; the nature
and scope of the illegal operation at issue; the personal benefit reaped by the claimant; the value
of the contraband involved; the fair market value of the defendant property to be forfeited; the
intangible/subjective value of the defendant property to be forfeited; hardship to the claimant;
other sanctions imposed by the sovereign seeking forfeiture; and the effect of the forfeiture on
the claimant's family or financial circumstances. Id. At oral argument, counsel for McHugh
argued:
... although the Reids didn't list the [Reese]4 factors, I did list those for the Court
in my briefing. And I would note that it is important for the Court to realize that
the Reids did not provide the Court with evidence of the value of the vehicle, that
the Reids did not testify that it was their only means of transportation, and the
Reids never noted that the maximum fine that the legislature established for a
conviction under---of delivery of marijuana is $25,000. Your Honor, this is a six4 The transcript incorrectly indicates counsel argued Claimants had not set forth "the Reids'
factors." Tr. p. 28, L. 23. Reference was in fact made to the Reese factors.
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year-old FJ Cruiser. There is no indication that the value of this FJ Cruiser
somehow exceeds [the] maximum possible imposed fine of $25,000.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, Ll. 22-25; p. 29, Ll. 1-8. Claimants submitted no additional briefing to the
district court to support their argument and respond to McHugh's Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. At oral argument, counsel for Claimant Jeffrey Reid
incorrectly claimed there had been no plea to manufacturing. Tr. Vol. I, p. 32, L. 9. Counsel for
Claimant Sandra Snyder-Reid incorrectly claimed she pled to simple possession. 5 Tr. Vol. I, p.
32, L. 6. The attempt by Claimants to downplay the severity of the charges they pled guilty to,
in an attempt to establish the forfeiture was excessive, was unsupported by any authority or
evidence. Claimant Jeffrey Reids' counsel argued:
In this case not only have we provided in our briefing documents that show-it is
Exhibit 3 in our motion to return the previously-seized vehicle pending
disposition of the state's complaint seeking forfeiture. It is payment schedule on
and a balance for the account history. This vehicle was purchased through Avista,
which is where my client works. And the car is being paid back to Avista through
my client's paycheck.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 32, Ll. 19-25; p. 33, L. 1. In briefing, Claimants stated simply, "[t]his is the
claimant's [sic] major mode of transportation and would be prohibitive to replace." R. Vol. I, p.
201. At best, Claimants have provided a bare minimum of evidence as to only one of the
numerous factors established to determine whether a punitive fine is grossly disproportionate to
the gravity of the offense, namely, hardship. "The burden of demonstrating a violation of the
Eighth Amendment is on the person asserting the constitutional violation." Reese, 142 Idaho at

5 Counsel later corrected the record and admitted his client had pled guilty to manufacturing
marijuana. Tr. Vol. I, p. 35, Ll. 15-16.

10

899, 1236 P.3d at 370 (citing Us. v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805, 816 (4th Cir. 2000) and State v.
Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 946, 71 P.3d 1088, 1093 (Ct.App. 2003». The district court properly

determined that Claimants had not met their burden, and that no question of material fact
remained with regard to the FJ Cruiser, specifically stating, " ... the fact that a party may put an
argument in a brief doesn't raise a genuine issue of material fact." Tr. Vol. I, p. 38, Ll. 9-11.
Having not met their burden below via the complete failure to present evidence of the Reese
factors, Claimants cannot now make the argument to this Court or support their untimely
arguments with evidence not presented to the district court.

C.

CLAIMANT'S
PLEA ESTABLISHES THE
DEFENDANT
VEHICLE WAS USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISTRIBUTION
OR
RECEIPT
OF
MARIJUANA,
RENDERING
THE
FORFEITURE PROPER

A guilty plea "is a judicial admission of all facts charged by the indictment or
information" and by entering a plea, a defendant waives all non-jurisdictional constitutional or
statutory defects and defenses. State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543, 546, 661 P.2d 328, 331 (1983). It
is without question that a guilty plea may be used to establish issue preclusion, or collateral
estoppel, in a subsequent civil suit. United States v. Section 18, 976 F.2d 515, 519 (9 th Cir.
1992); Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9 th Cir. 1978). Claimants' argument that the

record is devoid of evidence that the defendant vehicle was used for the purpose of distribution
or receipt of marijuana is entirely inapt given Claimant Jeffrey Reid's guilty plea to delivery of
manJuana.
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As previously argued to the district court, Claimant Jeffrey Reid pled guilty to the
delivery of marijuana. R. Vol. I., pp. 123-127. Specifically, Claimant Jeffrey Reid pled to the
Second Amended Information, which accuses:
That the Defendant, JEFFREY ALBERT REID, on or about the 2nd day of
January, 2012, in the County of Kootenai, State ofIdaho, did knowingly and
unlawfully deliver a controlled substance, to-wit: marijuana, a Schedule I
controlled substance ...
R. Vol. I, pp. 133-34. Idaho's Uniform Controlled Substances Act defines "deliver" or
"delivery" as "the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one (1) person to another of a
controlled substance ... " I.C. § 37-2701(g). "Distribute" is defined in the Idaho Code as meaning
"to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled substance." I.C. § 37-2701(k).
Statutory interpretation necessarily involves a statute being construed as a whole in order to give
effect to legislative intent. George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797
P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Sf. Alphonsus Reg. Med

etr., 151 Idaho 889, 895-86, 265 P.3d 502, 508-09 (2011). Therefore, Idaho Code § 372744(a)( 4)'s language, stating that conveyances used, or intended for use, to transport, or
facilitate the transportation, delivery, receipt, possession or concealment, of controlled
substances for the purpose of distribution or receipt are subject to forfeiture, must be read in
conjunction with the definitions in I.C. § 37-2701.

It follows that Claimant Jeffrey Reid's guilty plea to delivery of marijuana as charged in
the Information, and on the date of the facts testified to by Deputy Stinebaugh in his affidavit,
necessarily establishes that the defendant FJ Cruiser was used to transport or facilitate the
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transportation, delivery, receipt, possession or concealment, for the distribution or receipt of
marijuana. Claimant Jeffrey Reid's plea is a judicial admission to the Second Amended
Information. R. Vol. I, pp. 133-34. And, the Affidavit of Deputy Stinebaugh sets forth
uncontested evidence that, on January 2,2012, Jeffrey Reid consented to a search of the
defendant FJ Cruiser, that marijuana fell from the vehicle as Jeffrey Reid opened the rear door,
that Deputy Stinebaugh smelled the strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle, and that
Deputy Stinebaugh saw cardboard boxes with marijuana plant material in them in the rear of the
vehicle. R. Vol. I, p. 113. Claimant Jeffrey Reid has pled to delivering marijuana to another by
means other than administering or dispensing. Nothing to dispute the uncontested facts before
the district court was presented by Claimants and, because no genuine issue of material fact
existed with regard to forfeiture of the defendant vehicle, the district court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of McHugh.
Claimants cite at length to Ada County Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary
Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351, 298 P .3d 245 (2013), in which this Court agreed with the district

court that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a motorcycle was used to
transport "for the purposes of distribution or receipt" where methamphetamine was found inside
the driver's jacket. Claimants argue that McHugh cannot demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that Claimant Jeffrey Reid's transportation of marijuana was "for the purpose of
distribution or receipt" of marijuana. Defendant-Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 21. However,
McHugh has done so via the evidence of Claimant Jeffrey Reid's plea, ajudicial admission that
he knowingly and unlawfully transferred a controlled substance, to-wit: marijuana to another
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person. R. Vol. I., pp. 123-127. Having pled to "delivery," Claimant Jeffrey Reid "distributed"
marijuana within the meaning of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act because he "delivered
[the marijuana] other than by administering or dispensing" it. I.C. § 37-2701(k).
Further, the facts of 2007 Legendary Motorcycle are readily distinguishable from the
instant matter. Importantly, the claimant Christopher Rubey pled to simple possession in the
criminal matter underlying the civil asset forfeiture in 2007 Legendary Motorcycle. 154 Idaho at
298 P.3d 245,246. And, the methamphetamine at issue in the case was found on
Christopher Rubey's person. Id Here, Claimant Jeffrey Reid pled to delivery of marijuana and
marijuana was found in the vehicle, not on his person. Incredibly, Claimants readily admit that
Claimant Jeffrey Reid delivered marijuana to his wife. Defendant-Appellant's Opening Brief,
pp. 17 and 22. The district court properly found no questions of material fact exist with regard
to whether the defendant vehicle was used to transport, deliver, receive, possess and/or conceal
marijuana for the purposes of distribution or receipt.

D.

RESPONDENT BARRY MCHUGH IS ENTITLED TO HIS
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS UNDER IDAHO
CODE § 12-117 BECAUSE CLAIMANTS ACTED WITHOUT A
REASONABLE BASIS IN FACT OR LAW.

Idaho Code § 12-117 was amended, effective March 27,2012, to clarify that an award of
fees is not limited to only administrative proceedings or civil judicial proceedings involving a
political subdivision where a non-prevailing party acts without reasonable basis in fact or law.
Cf Smith v. Washington, 150 Idaho 388, 391-93, 247 P.3d 615,618-20 (2010). At present
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subsection (1) reads in its entirety:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency,
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal,
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and
other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without
a reasonable basis in fact or law.
I.C. § 12-117(1).6 The instant matter involves a civil judicial proceeding commenced via filing
ofthe Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Complaint Re: Civil Forfeiture on January 19.
2012.
For the reasons set forth supra, Claimants acted without any reasonable basis in fact or
law. Claimants cannot be deemed the prevailing party on the instant appeal. As such, the Court
"shall" award McHugh his reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable
expenses. See I.e. § 12-117(1).

V. CONCLUSION

Claimants are attempting to appeal the stipulated Judgment of Forfeiture entered on
February 21,2013. A consent judgment is generally not appealable, and Claimants have not and
cannot demonstrate that any exception to the general rule is applicable. Appeal of the district
court's summary judgment is limited to issues raised and evidence presented before the lower

6 The Idaho Supreme Court has not distinguished between the agency representative! elected
official and state agency! political subdivision for the purposes of awarding attorney fees. See
Jenkins v. Barsalou, 145 Idaho 202, 177 P.3d 949 (2007). The statute provides for an award of
fees to the prevailing party upon a finding that the "nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law." Idaho Code § 12-117(1).
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court. As such, Claimants are barred from now presenting evidence of the value of the defendant
vehicle, evidence which was never before the district court. And, having pled to delivery of
marijuana and manufacturing of marijuana, Claimants cannot now claim that there existed
insufficient evidence of a nexus between the defendant vehicle and distribution or receipt of a
controlled substance. The district Court properly found an absence of material issues of fact and
McHugh's entitlement to the defendant vehicle as a matter oflaw at summary judgment; the
parties' stipulated judgment thereafter renders the instant appeal improper as a matter oflaw.
Claimants acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, and therefore McHugh is
entitled to an awarded of his reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable
expenses in accordance with I.C. § 12-117 on appeal.

Dated this ___ day of August, 2013.
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

lamila D. Holmes, Civil Deputy
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
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